Global Israel Initiative
The premise of SIGNAL Group’s Global Israel Initiative (GII) is that the most effective strategy for Israel to contend with both China’s adversarial positions and the U.S.-China rivalry is to act as a middle power and focus on the Indo-Pacific Arena
What is the Indo-Pacific?
The Indo-Pacific refers to all the countries of South and Southeast Asia, and the Eastern Pacific Rim, except for China and North Korea, and is, essentially, a geo-strategic term associated with the experience of the countries of the Indian and Pacific Ocean in addressing the opportunities and challenges associated with the rise of China.
The term appeared for the first time in an official (Australian) document in 2013 and was strongly advocated by the late Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe. The rationale behind this new term is to envision the Indian and Pacific oceans as one geographical unit to address China’s rise. In less than a decade, Indo-Pacific has gained enormous traction; almost all Western countries, and the European Union, have published Indo-Pacific strategies. In Israel however, the term is barely known.
Why should Israel focus on the Indo-Pacific?
The global economy is moving towards the Indo-Pacific. Likewise, Israel’s national security interests point to the Indo-Pacific where emerging security concerns motivate greater interest in joint R&D in such areas as defense and cutting-edge technologies of the 4th industrial revolution. Israel can collaborate with countries in the region in areas such as nano-technology, cyber, chip and fabrication plant equipment design, quantum, biotechnology and defense. Such cooperation serves the respective national interests of the Indo-Pacific counties and those of Israel.
What is a “middle power”?
Although there is no clear definition for the concept of middle powers, the most distinctive characteristic of middle powers is their ability to “punch above their weight” to promote their respective interests and priorities by enhancing their strategic autonomy and agency.
Considered an influential and significant country that is not a great power, the term “middle power” is a broad classification attributed to a large variety of countries. For example, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam are all considered middle powers in the Indo-Pacific. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar fashion themselves as middle powers. Most of the middle powers in the current international system are U.S. allies or strategic partners. Exceptions include Brazil and South Africa.
Middle powers’ course of diplomatic action often includes setting up coalitions and international fora and collaborating with other middle powers. In some cases, however, middle powers have included the U.S. in their initiatives. One of the most prominent results of this diplomatic activism is the spread of small multilateral fora, also known as “minilaterals”, such as the trilateral forum of France, India, and Australia.
Middle power is not a synonym for regional power although there is a considerable overlap between the two terms. Indeed, a significant part of a middle power’s scope of operation is regional, and it derives much of its global influence and prowess from its regional assets. However, the diplomatic reach of a middle power is not limited only to the territorial boundaries of its immediate environment. In contrast to a regional power that focuses entirely on its immediate neighborhood, a middle power would identify and prioritize opportunities to advance its interests in the global arena as well.
Although the concept of “middle power” is little known in Israel, most of the world seems to take for granted that Israel is, indeed, a middle power. The fact that Indo-Pacific countries are increasingly interested in Israel’s areas of expertise only speaks to its growing role as middle power. In recent years, Israel has demonstrated itself as a middle power in its immediate neighborhood – be it through the trilateral strategic partnership with Cyprus and Greece, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, the Negev Forum, or I2U2.
Why does Israel need a new China strategy?
Over the past few years, Chinese policies towards Israel have become increasingly adversarial and some of its actions in the Middle East threaten core Israeli interests, engendering the need for a more robust strategy. In short, as China shifts its approach, so must Israel.
While China has long held a traditional pro-Palestinian position, it only became vigorously anti-Israeli more recently. Arguably, this occurred when Beijing realized that critical technologies from Israel were not easily accessible and that Israel would not be drawn into China’s orbit like the Gulf countries. China’s anti-Israel stance could be used to both create ‘trouble’ for the U.S. in the midst of the growing U.S.-China rivalry and burnish its reputation as the leader of the Global South (the 130+ developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America). Beijing uses anti-Israel campaigns to undermine the moral standing of the U.S. in an attempt to discredit American criticism of China’s human rights records and increase voting support from Global South countries for China in international institutions. A direct example of China taking an anti-Israel stance to also damage the U.S. reputation occurred during the 2021 operation in Gaza during which China vilified U.S. support of Israel’s right to self-defense and exploited its rotating presidency of the UN Security Council to harm Israeli interests.
After the October 7th genocidal attack by Hamas, China’s positions became more adversarial: China refrained from issuing a condemnation of Hamas or of the attack; a Chinese envoy met publicly with Hamas leader in Qatar for the first time in March; at an ICJ hearing in Hague on South Africa’s Gaza genocide case against Israel, the Legal Advisor of China’s foreign ministry recognized the Palestinian right of “armed resistance” implying that Hamas attacks on Israel are not acts of terrorism, but rather legitimate actions; China’s state-owned global container shipping company officially stopped service to Israeli ports following the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Taken together with credible reports of Chinese negotiations with the Houthis to ensure safe passage for Chinese vessels in the Red Sea, it is clear that China sided with Iran and its proxies to Israel’s detriment. This is part of a closer alignment between Beijing, Moscow, Teheran, and Pyongyang.
China has broad strategic interests in the Arab Middle East. Its energy needs remain an important factor in its relations with the Arab world, but now extend far beyond to include the economic, political and diplomatic realms. Given the growing global trust deficit in China’s political and economic policies, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country has sharply declined, making Saudi and Emirati financial reserves a significant source of new FDI. On the political and diplomatic fronts, China’s bid to admit three key Arab states – Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt – to the prestigious BRICS forum in summer 2023 indicates the significance of these countries for Chinese diplomacy. Beijing views Arab countries’ public, steadfast support of its positions on the Muslim minority in Xinjiang as crucial to repudiating Western allegations. Facilitating the Saudi-Iranian détente in March 2023 was viewed in Beijing as a huge coup. The deal was leveraged to undermine the U.S.-led security order in the Gulf and Middle East. China capitalized on its role to give official credence to one of its three “global initiatives” – the Global Security Initiative (GSI)- by including it in the agreements signed by the Saudis and Iranians, directly endorsing the GSI. President Xi Jinping has stated clearly that the GSI along with his two other initiatives, the Global Development and Global Civilization Initiatives, will serve to reshape global governance in China’s favor. In fact, in recent years, China has steadily sought to use the Middle East as a testing ground for its agenda to rewrite the international order – by persuading the Arab Middle East to join a Chinese-led regional order that excludes Israel and pulls the Gulf states further into its orbit.
Notably, China’s increasing engagement with key Arab countries has come at the expense of Israel and has limited its potential benefits from the Abraham Accords. For example, Chinese involvement in UAE’s advanced high-tech scene and China’s growing hold in its IT infrastructure limits the ability of the Israeli high-tech sector to engage with Emirati counterparts due to concerns about tech transfer.
SIGNAL Group’s GII seeks to offer measures that could deter China from damaging Israel’s interests while at the same time advancing Israel’s diplomatic and economic successes. The GII approach can discourage Beijing’s tendency to use Israel as a “punching bag” to score points with either Arab states or the “Global South”; (b) help create economic opportunities for Israel and Indo-Pacific countries; (c) limit China’s ability to damage the Abraham accords while at the same time help hedge against risks to Israel of China’s increasing penetration in the Arab world that could cause damage.
Why is the GII an effective strategy for Israel vis-à-vis China?
As a strategic initiative to advance Israel as a middle power focusing on the Indo-Pacific arena, GII is designed to enhance Israel’s international influence and bolster its strategic posture and resilience. Compared to other great powers and international actors, China’s policies are affected by demonstrations of international prowess and sway.
The GII takes into consideration China’s unique history, very different from that of the west, its approach to the world and the statecraft it employs that are incomparable to all other nations. One way to capture a critical dimension of China’s unique statecraft is to acknowledge that Chinese do not play Chess, they play GO or Wei qi. In Chess, players place all their pieces on the board at the outset and aim for total victory by taking the king. In Wei qi, players add pieces as needed to achieve strategic encirclement. The focus is to mitigate the strategic potential of the challenger and maneuver a subtle win without the other player even realizing what happened. Similarly, on the international stage, the goal is not to conquer or subjugate, but to coax and moderate using overwhelming leverage that needs no explicit reference. Victory is sought through gaining a psychological advantage while avoiding direct conflict. Therefore, China’s signature tool is the consistent effort to establish asymmetric dependencies that it could leverage at a critical juncture determined by its interests – in the short-, mid-, and long-term. One of the most effective strategies to counteract Chinese asymmetric dependencies is to establish countervailing partnerships formed through networks of partnership with other countries.
China recognizes and respects the diplomatic standing of countries measured in terms of the reach, scope, and intricacy of a nation’s set of partnerships with other countries. In other words, China aims to bet on the winning horse.
Israel has already proven that when it expands its partnerships – and particularly in areas of strategic interest for China – Israel earns China’s respect as a winner. While at first China was negatively predisposed towards the Abraham Accords (2020/2021), when it realized that the Accords were leading to meaningful and durable outcomes (2021/2022), it changed its tone and sought to improve relations with Israel. China began reducing its harsh anti-Israel after Israel’s Fall 2024 significant military and operational successes in the wars with Hamas and Hezbollah. This led Beijing, in early 2025, to begin efforts to repair damaged relations with Israel. Similarly, one can expect that closer Israeli ties with major countries in China’s immediate neighborhood – the Indo-Pacific – will draw not only Chinese attention, but might persuade China to shift its approach towards Israel. The GII’s aim to draw Indo-Pacific countries into collaboration with Israel and other Middle East countries, collectively in various formats, will likely serve to reinforce the view of Israel as a winner, leading to a more positive attitude towards Israel in Beijing.
Why is the GII an effective strategy for Israel in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry?
A middle power strategy for Israel – enhancing strategic autonomy and agency and focusing on the Indo-Pacific – would be beneficial not only in bolstering Israeli influence and reputation vis-à-vis China, but also relevant in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry.
First, Israel drew China’s ire and became collateral damage as Beijing sought to repudiate the U.S. Although the U.S. is – and will remain – Israel’s closest ally and cornerstone of its national security, an inseparable association of America and Israel is in neither’s best interests. Israel will always hold America’s national security, steadfast support and advice in the highest regard, but will retain its independence to formulate, pursue and defend its own interests. Furthermore, Israel as an influential, respected middle power on the global stage with budding ties in the Indo-Pacific will become a more valuable asset to the U.S.
Secondly, just as other middle powers that are U.S. allies have already experienced, Israel might soon discover that its priorities vis-à-vis China differ from those of Washington. The differences stem from Israel’s size and location. In the near future, Jerusalem’s China policy priorities will likely be shaped by Chinese involvement and engagement in the Middle East. Washington’s concerns are global, with a core focus on Taiwan and the South China Sea as well as China’s penetration of America’s ‘backyard’ in Latin America, managing the Moscow-Beijing-Teheran-Pyongyang growing alliance and setting ever-wider limits on China’s access to disruptive technologies.
Third, the great power rivalry is the defining feature of the current era. The global and intricate nature of the rivalry seems to be redefining the geopolitical and geostrategic thinking of the U.S. and among its European and Indo-Pacific allies: The Middle East is not a standalone theater; it is part of a “united front” connecting the Indo-Pacific and Europe. As the war in the Ukraine demonstrated that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are a “united front”, so has the war in Gaza demonstrated that the Middle East is also part of this front. In a “united front” geopolitical world, Israel cannot achieve its most critical strategic interests by only acting as a regional power. GII is a roadmap for Israel to navigate the great power rivalry.
The Chinese understanding of middle powers and their strategic autonomy reflects a gross distortion of reality. China warmly and persistently encourages the EU to strengthen its strategic autonomy, anticipating that this will distance Europe from America. However, Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is not about avoiding having to choose between the U.S. and China. Rather, European middle powers’ quest for strategic autonomy aims to bolster their respective posture vis-à-vis China and to strengthen their agency to pursue their priorities, while mitigating the risks associated with over-reliance on U.S. strategic support and defense. This is equally true for Israel.
What are SIGNAL Group’s organizational opportunities in pursuing the GII?
Evolving geopolitical developments – on both the global stage and in the Middle East – have generated circumstances that must be addressed by Israel, both to foster new opportunities and to mitigate a range of risks. The increasing challenges created by China for Israel mandate an innovative strategy that transcends the China issue to address the China issue, and offers credible benefits to Israel’s national security writ large. China’s ongoing aim to draw the Middle East into its orbit while reshaping the security architecture of the region as part of its push for wider global changes warrant a strategy such as the GII.
SIGNAL Group’s well-established credentials analyzing China’s domestic and foreign policy and tracking and assessing the U.S.-China rivalry, as well as its track record in building global networks, well place SIGNAL Group to play an increasingly central role in Israeli foreign policy and national security discussions. Drawing on over 15 years of intensive focus on China and in developing innovative approaches to empowering Israel to address a rising China, SIGNAL Group is committed to the success of the Global Israel Initiative.