Global Israel Initiative
The premise of SIGNAL Group’s Global Israel Initiative (GII) is that the most effective strategy for Israel to address both China’s rise and the U.S.-China rivalry is to focus on the Indo-Pacific and act as a middle power.
What is the Indo-Pacific?
The Indo-Pacific refers to all the countries of South and Southeast Asia, and the Eastern Pacific Rim, except for China and North Korea, and is, essentially, a geo-strategic term associated with the experience of the countries of the Indian and Pacific Ocean in addressing the opportunities and challenges associated with the rise of China.
The term appeared for the first time in an official (Australian) document in 2013 and was strongly advocated by the late Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe. The rationale behind this new term is to envision the Indian and Pacific oceans as one geographical unit to address China’s rise. In less than a decade, Indo-Pacific has gained enormous traction; almost all Western countries, and the European Union, have published Indo-Pacific strategies. In Israel however, the term is barely known.
Why should Israel focus on the Indo-Pacific?
The global economy is moving towards the Indo-Pacific. Likewise, Israel’s national security interests point to the Indo-Pacific where emerging security concerns motivate greater interest in joint R&D in such areas as defense and cutting-edge technologies of the 4th industrial revolution. Israel can collaborate with countries in the region in areas such as nano-technology, cyber, chip and fabrication plant equipment design, quantum, biotechnology and defense. Such cooperation serves the respective national interests of the Indo-Pacific counties and those of Israel.
What is a “middle power”?
Although there is no clear definition for the concept of middle powers, the most distinctive characteristic of middle powers is their ability to “punch above their weight” to promote their respective interests and priorities by enhancing their strategic autonomy and agency.
Considered an influential and significant country that is not a great power, the term “middle power” is a broad classification attributed to a large variety of countries. For example, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam are all considered middle powers in the Indo-Pacific. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar fashion themselves as middle powers. Most of the middle powers in the current international system are U.S. allies or strategic partners. Exceptions include Brazil and South Africa.
Middle powers’ course of diplomatic action often includes setting up coalitions and international fora and collaborating with other middle powers. In some cases, however, middle powers have included the U.S. in their initiatives. One of the most prominent results of this diplomatic activism is the spread of small multilateral fora, also known as “minilaterals”, such as the trilateral forum of France, India, and Australia.
Middle power is not a synonym for regional power although there is a considerable overlap between the two terms. Indeed, a significant part of a middle power’s scope of operation is regional, and it derives much of its global influence and prowess from its regional assets. However, the diplomatic reach of a middle power is not limited only to the territorial boundaries of its immediate environment. In contrast to a regional power that focuses entirely on its immediate neighborhood, a middle power would identify and prioritize opportunities to advance its interests in the global arena as well.
Although the concept of “middle power” is little known in Israel, most of the world seems to take for granted that Israel is, indeed, a middle power. The fact that Indo-Pacific countries are increasingly interested in Israel’s areas of expertise only speaks to its growing role as middle power. In recent years, Israel has demonstrated itself as a middle power in its immediate neighborhood – be it through the trilateral strategic partnership with Cyprus and Greece, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, the Negev Forum, or I2U2.
Why does Israel need a new China strategy?
Over the past few years, China’s positions and policies towards Israel have become more adversarial. While China has always held a traditional pro-Palestinian position, Beijing prided itself on maintaining balance through broadened relations with Israel in a wide range of arenas. However, its stance towards Israel became harsher since the signing of the Abraham Accords. China’s increasing engagement with key Arab countries, specifically its technology inroads, has come, at times, at the expense of Israel, and has exposed China’s potential to limit the benefits of the Abraham Accords.
Furthermore, the trajectory of the U.S.-China rivalry and China’s expanding relations with Russia, Iran, and North Korea raise concern in Israel. Furthermore, as a supporter of the existing global order, Israel faces similar challenges and concerns to other like-minded states regarding China’s stated goal to refashion global governance through its series of “global initiatives” launched by President Xi since 2021 – the Global Civilizations Initiative (GCI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Certain Chinese policies and diplomatic actions emanating from these initiatives could undermine Israel’s national interests. For instance, Beijing’s aim to bring the Palestinian conflict for adjudication in the UN under the provisions of the GSI could harm Israel.
Given that the U.S.-China great power rivalry has become a defining feature of an evolving multipolar world with deep implications for the Middle East, Israel’s ability to pursue its national interests and priorities vis-à-vis China and beyond will require a new strategic approach. In short, as China shifts its approach, so must Israel.
Why is the GII an effective strategy for Israel vis-à-vis China?
The GII is designed to respect and effectively address “Chinese characteristics”. China’s unique history, its approach to the world, and the statecraft it employs are incomparable. China recognizes and respects the diplomatic standing of countries measured in terms of the reach, scope, and intricacy of a nation’s set of partnerships with other countries. Therefore, Beijing’s policies are particularly affected by demonstrations of international prowess and sway, or in other words, China aims to bet on the winning horse. Thus, the GII seeks to enhance Israel’s international influence and bolster its strategic posture and resilience by expanding and deepening its ties as a middle power with Indo Pacific countries.
Israel has already proven that when it expands its partnerships – and particularly in areas of strategic interest for China – Israel earns Beijing’s respect as a winner. While at first China was negatively predisposed towards the Abraham Accords (2020/2021), when it realized that the Accords were leading to meaningful and durable outcomes (2021/2022), it changed its tone and sought to improve relations with Israel at the behest of China’s Arab partners in the region. This position shifted once again when China realized that the U.S. administration is actively leveraging the Abraham Accords to diminish Beijing’s influence.
Therefore, one can expect that closer Israeli ties with major countries in China’s immediate neighborhood – the Indo-Pacific – will draw not only Chinese attention but might persuade China to adjust its approach towards Israel once again. The GII aims to draw Indo-Pacific countries into collaboration with Israel and other Middle East countries, collectively in various formats. In turn, this will likely serve to reinforce the view of Israel as a winner, leading to a more positive attitude towards Israel in Beijing.
Why is the GII an effective strategy for Israel in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry?
An Indo-Pacific middle power strategy for Israel would not only bolster Israel’s influence and reputation vis-à-vis China but is also relevant in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry.
First, Israel as an influential, respected middle power on the global stage with budding ties in the Indo-Pacific will become a more valuable asset to the U.S.
Secondly, moving ahead, Jerusalem’s China policy priorities will likely be shaped by Chinese involvement and engagement in the Middle East, whereas Washington’s concerns will remain global, with a core focus on Northeast Asia. Like other middle powers that are U.S. allies, Israel might soon discover that its priorities vis-à-vis China differ from those of Washington. Israel will have to rely on its own agency and capabilities to address future challenges.
Third, the global and intricate nature of the rivalry seems to be redefining the geopolitical thinking of the U.S. and its European and Indo-Pacific allies: The Middle East is not a standalone theater; it is interconnected with the Indo-Pacific and Europe. As the war in the Ukraine demonstrated that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are one arena, the war in Gaza demonstrated that the Middle East is also part of it. In this interconnected geopolitical world, Israel cannot achieve its most critical strategic interests by only acting as a regional power. GII is a roadmap for Israel to navigate the great power rivalry and pursue its national interests.
Israel’s ability to pursue its national interests and priorities vis-à-vis China and beyond will require expanding its diplomatic/strategic outreach to the Indo-Pacific as a middle power and the GII is designed to do just that.
Why is SIGNAL Group pursuing this new strategic initiative?
China’s growing role on the world stage compels SIGNAL Group to adapt its approach to remain effective in its mission to empower Israel to successfully manage relations with Beijing. Evolving geopolitical developments, on both the global stage and in the Middle East, mandate an innovative strategy for Israel that transcends the China issue to deal with it. Such a strategy must offer credible benefits to Israel’s national security writ large. As Israel’s only East-facing think tank and a public policy disruptor, SIGNAL Group views Israel’s middle power potential as a foundational approach for securing its national interests and bolstering its agency and strategic autonomy. Israel has unrealized potential as a middle power on the world stage. By applying its “start-up nation” entrepreneurial spirit to its diplomatic engagement across the global arena, and specifically in the Indo-Pacific, Israel can capitalize on new opportunities while hedging against risks associated with China’s growing inroads in the Middle East.
Taken together, a broad, clear-eyed strategic vision fused with ambitious entrepreneurial diplomacy will enhance Israel’s ability to address its most vital strategic priorities as it contends with the tectonic shifts in the Middle East and global arena.
SIGNAL Group’s suite of programs generates opportunities for Israel’s leaders and the policy establishment to rethink relations with China and the world, and to fashion new coalitions and diplomatic initiatives with like-minded middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe. The GII contributes to the development of new policy options that strengthen Israel’s geopolitical position facing both East and West.
SIGNAL Group’s credentials analyzing China’s domestic and foreign policies and the U.S.-China rivalry, along with its global network, well position it to play an instrumental role in Israeli foreign policy and national security discussions. Drawing on 15 years of intensive focus on China and in developing innovative approaches to empowering Israel to address a rising China, SIGNAL Group is committed to the success of the Global Israel Initiative.