When world leaders gathered at the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023 to announce the launch of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the message was unmistakable: Arab-Israeli normalization is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape global connectivity.
Linking India to Europe via the Gulf and Israel, it promised to fuse trade, infrastructure and strategic cooperation into a single framework that could transform the Middle East’s economic geography. In turn, connectivity would reinforce peace in the Middle East.
For Israel, IMEC offered even more. It was a platform to project itself as a middle power connecting the Indo-Pacific, the Gulf and Europe—a tangible way to embed Israel in the emerging architecture of the Middle East and the global arena. Then came the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre and the war in Gaza. The corridor’s momentum evaporated almost overnight.
The world seems to have moved on. IMEC’s original architects—India, the United Arab Emirates and the United States—continue to discuss its future, while the European Union has institutionalized its involvement under the Global Gateway initiative.
Yet Israel, once envisioned as a pivotal junction of the corridor, is no longer part of the conversation. Some of the stakeholders are trying to exclude Israel and offer detour routes, while other partners consider Israel to be distracted and disengaged. That perception, if left uncorrected, could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
IMEC was born out of the I2U2 framework a strategic dialogue launched in 2022 among the United States, India, Israel and the UAE to deepen cooperation on connectivity, clean energy and technology. When the national security advisers of the United States, India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE met in Riyadh in May 2023, they laid the groundwork for the initiative.
Washington’s original intent was clear: to reinforce and expand the 2020 Abraham Accords by connecting key U.S. partners through a network of trade routes, railways, ports and digital infrastructure while offering a rules-based alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
For Israel, IMEC promised to achieve additional strategic objectives simultaneously. It would deepen partnerships with India and the Gulf states and position it as an indispensable link in global supply chains at a time when reliability is the new currency of power.
In short, IMEC was an opportunity to leverage the impending Saudi-Israeli normalization to bolster Israel’s regional visibility and international relevance.
The war halted Israel’s indirect engagement just as the project was beginning to take shape. But the challenges to IMEC’s progress extend far beyond Oct. 7 and the war in Gaza. Even had hostilities ceased earlier, formidable obstacles would, and still, remain—from shifting U.S. priorities to competing European agendas and regional rivalries.
India remains strongly committed to IMEC. For Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is a signature initiative that reinforces his country’s global aspirations and strengthens its partnerships with the Gulf and Israel. Yet Indian officials express growing frustration with Israel’s apparent inattention.
In their view, the Jewish state has failed to grasp IMEC’s long-term significance. This criticism is not unfounded. However, since the initiative’s inception in the first half of 2023, Israel was an absent-present stakeholder remaining behind the scenes as long as Riyadh and Jerusalem did not normalize diplomatic relations. Under those circumstances, Israeli engagement would remain limited.
Meanwhile, Europe began developing a keen interest in the initiative. This interest became evident as three European Mediterranean countries informally competed among themselves in a bid to “nominate” their respective ports as IMEC’s European hub.
France proposed Marseille, Italy promoted Trieste and Greece put forward Piereus. Although there was no objective reason for this unofficial squabbling—there was no requirement to designate one specific European port—it demonstrated the international demand and rationale for the initiative.
As the European backbiting led nowhere, France and Italy decided to bury the hatchet. The E.U. Commission now leads the European end of IMEC.
The commission has placed in charge two directorate-generals (the E.U. equivalent of government ministries) that will coordinate with an even larger group of European stakeholders in a new framework known as “Team Europe.” The commission has also committed to contributing financial resources and support for IMEC through its Global Gateway platform.
While this might seem an efficient outcome, the institutional arrangement raises concerns. While the Global Gateway is defined by the commission as an “investment strategy,” the designated directorates generals—DG International Partnerships and DG MENA— have limited experience managing complex connectivity projects.
The newly established DG MENA that is in charge of the E.U.’s relations with Middle East and North Africa has a long-standing negative record with Israel and a very reluctant position towards the Abraham Accords, which ironically are at the core of IMEC’s rationale.
Early European discussions about involving the Palestinian Authority, despite the route not crossing Palestinian territory, underscore how quickly the project could be derailed by old political reflexes.
To complicate matters further, the United States is sending mixed signals. While Washington continues to endorse the IMEC officially, U.S.-India relations have been strained recently. Washington’s attention may have also shifted to a competing corridor launched in August 2024: the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), linking Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey.
This new initiative, which grants the U.S. exclusive development rights for nearly a century, underscores Ankara’s growing role and positions Turkey as IMEC’s chief regional rival.
The question for Israel is not whether IMEC will proceed, but whether Israel will be at its center or left on its margins. If Israel continues to sit on the sidelines, others will define the region’s future connectivity without it.
That would mean forfeiting a unique opportunity to deepen strategic ties with India and the Gulf, rebuild trust with partners who view Israel as indispensable yet unpredictable, and create a viable opportunity for expanding Israel’s engagement in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.
Moreover, IMEC’s logic goes far beyond infrastructure. It represents a new mode of regional cooperation—pragmatic, multipolar and interest-driven—that fits precisely with Israel’s comparative advantages. The corridor’s land segment, connecting the UAE through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel, is already operational at a modest scale via private logistics apps and trucking routes.
With strategic coordination, Israel could transform this embryonic route into a cornerstone of its regional strategy and economic security.
Israel cannot afford to wait any longer to re-engage. As the war in Gaza winds down, Jerusalem can pursue several practical steps. First, Israel should launch a trilateral dialogue with India and the UAE. Since having advanced I2U2, this partnership is the cornerstone of IMEC’s original design.
Coordinating positions with New Delhi and Abu Dhabi—and possibly including Greece, which seems to have been sidelined from the European track—can help craft a coherent approach to re-engaging Washington and a more constructive European position.
Along and in-coordination with its partners, Jerusalem should re-engage the U.S. highlighting IMEC’s economic and strategic value for Washington: bolstering trusted supply chains, sustaining the Abraham Accords, and balancing China’s influence. A strong trilateral initiative could help refocus U.S. attention and resources.
To demonstrate its interest and commitment to IMEC, Israel shouldappoint a dedicated governmental IMEC envoy. Before Oct. 7, Israel had planned to appoint a national IMEC coordinator based in the National Security Council.
Reviving that plan now would send a powerful signal of seriousness and continuity. The envoy would be well-positioned to utilize think tanks, business leaders and retired officials to advance dialogue informally, maintain momentum, and prepare the ground for formal diplomacy. These unofficial mechanisms are crucial while official engagement remain constrained.
IMEC’s future will not wait for Israel. The corridor’s other partners are moving ahead, shaping the project’s terms and defining the regional map of the next decade. If Israel fails to reclaim its place now, it risks being written out of one of the most consequential connectivity projects of the 21st century.
Re-engaging with IMEC is a strategic imperative. Doing so would demonstrate that even amid adversity, Israel is a credible partner in a rapidly shifting global order.
This article was originally published in JNS on October 20th, 2025. You can find that version here.
Cover photo: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announces the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in New Delhi at the G20 Summit in New Delhi on Sept. 9, 2023. Credit: Indian Prime Minister’s Office (GODL-India).
