Israel should pursue a multi-vector strategy that expands its presence across the Indo-Pacific while maintaining a pragmatic dialogue with Beijing.
The Iran–Israel war in June has redrawn strategic lines across the Middle East and beyond. While the immediate aftermath has focused on the military balance and Iran’s weakened regional posture, the conflict has also forced external powers to reconsider their respective postures and strategies.
Among them, China stands out. For over a decade, Beijing celebrated its expanding economic footprint and digital presence across the Middle East. Yet the war highlighted the limits of converting commercial access into strategic influence.
For Israel, the real question is not whether China has succeeded or failed but how shifting perceptions in Beijing can create opportunities. In the Middle East, China is recalibrating: adopting a more cautious tone, prioritizing economic stability and trying to hedge between Iran, Israel and the Gulf.
This posture, if read correctly, offers Israel both challenges and openings. The hopefully soon-to-become post-Gaza-war era will test Israel’s ability to navigate China’s careful balancing act, leverage Gulf partnerships and expand its presence in the Indo-Pacific to ensure its own strategic agency and national security.
China’s engagement in the region has never been static. Over the past decade, Beijing invested heavily in energy imports, infrastructure contracts and technology partnerships while avoiding direct military entanglements. Yet the Israel–Iran conflict revealed an uncomfortable truth for China: despite its deep ties with Tehran, its capacity to shape outcomes was limited. The war not only weakened Iran but also exposed China’s inability to translate economic investments into political influence.
Beijing has since adjusted its narrative. China is retroactively reframing its regional track record to avoid the appearance of overreach. This recalibration is instructive. It signals that China is risk-averse and seeks to preserve its reputation as an economic partner, not as a mediator or regional security guarantor. Events over the past year caused Beijing to recognize that overpromising and underdelivering in the Middle East undermines its credibility. It has therefore scaled back its strategic ambitions—at least rhetorically.
This shift matters for Israel. Its remarkable record of power projection over the past year in Lebanon, Syria and Iran has led Beijing’s diplomatic rhetoric toward Israel to become somewhat restrained, particularly regarding regional theatres beyond Gaza. Chinese diplomats even expressed appreciation for the Abraham Accords, suggesting that additional Muslim-majority countries might join. Privately, Chinese scholars acknowledged Israel’s resilience and its ability to shape regional dynamics.
For Israel, these signals point to a window of opportunity. If Gulf states already wield certain leverage over Beijing, Israel, working in tandem with them, can exert indirect influence. Jointly encouraging China to adopt more balanced messaging on the Palestinian issue or involving it in limited economic cooperation tied to Abraham Accords countries may yield results. Areas such as food technology, water management and desertification could be framed as win-win, provided China reins in its military or dual-use support for Tehran.
At the same time, Israel must recognize the limits of this opening. Beijing’s interest in Tehran remains significant. Preserving the Iranian regime, even weakened, is a Chinese priority. From Beijing’s perspective, Iran provides strategic depth against U.S. influence and serves as a cost-effective, albeit not critical, energy supplier. This means Israel should not expect a full pivot away from Iran, only adjustments at the margins.
While China’s modest warming to Israel is notable, it appears to be evaporating as mutual discontent is rising. Allegedly, intelligence reports that surfaced repeatedly in international media have tied Chinese entities to supplying essential dual-use items to support Iran’s war effort over the past year.
According to the reports, these items included electronic and digital components for drones and chemicals used for missile production. However, since the end of the Iran war, media reports now allege that China is considering, or even has agreed, to provide Iran with advanced Surface-to-Air missile systems to rebuild its battered air-defense. If China is providing these systems, it would be its first weapons sale (not just dual-use items) to Iran since 2005.
From an Israeli perspective, these reports suggest that while China is keen to sustain its “even-handed” façade, it is providing critical assistance to Iran that directly threatens Israel’s national security. These dual-use items were critical and enabled Iran and its proxies to attack Israel and to kill and injure Israeli civilians. The alleged Chinese upgrading of its defense exports to Iran to include “defensive” weaponry – if unchecked – could subsequently be expanded to include other items, such as advanced aircraft fighters that Tehran has long coveted.
If Jerusalem is indeed behind this series of international and Israeli reports, it amounts to a low-signature Israeli campaign to challenge Chinese interests and to undermine Beijing’s self-portrayed stance of “even-handedness” in the Middle East.
Beijing’s current messaging seems to reflect consternation with this line of Israeli signaling. Chinese officials categorically denied media reportsthat Beijing had supplied air-defense systems to Iran following the ceasefire. The denial was unusually swift and expansive, suggesting heightened sensitivity. It was designed to preserve China’s plausible deniability and prevent damage to its self-image as even-handed.
The mutual exchange of accusations has not ended there. Beijing considered a public statement made by Knesset members in August regarding Taiwan as an Israeli “act of retribution” for China’s anti-Israel positions after Oct. 7. The Chinese Embassy in Israel issued an unusually stern and lengthy protest, demonstrating how seriously Beijing treats issues touching on what it defines as its “core interests.”
For its part, Beijing might also be engaged in unmasking alleged Israeli covert operations. Chinese diplomats and scholars have recently raised in off-the-record settings (for now) concerns that Israel may be indirectly supporting Balochi militants operating in Iran and Pakistan, perhaps by conspiring with India.
The Balochi groups threaten infrastructure linked to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship component of the Belt and Road Initiative and key for China’s economic security. While there is no evidence to substantiate these claims, the fact that several Chinese scholar and diplomats are voicing them simultaneously underscores a shift toward suspicion and criticism.
Taken together, these developments show that while Beijing can adjust its tone toward Israel when it serves its interests, it can also pivot quickly to harsher rhetoric. For Israel, this underscores the fragility of any diplomatic “warming.” It also demonstrates that Beijing is quick to guard its reputational and strategic equities, even at the expense of bilateral goodwill. Beijing’s language could swiftly become categorical and unforgiving.
In any case, these exchanges also demonstrate that Israel is not powerless in the face of China but can to some extent shape and influence China’s posture and positions. Simply put, what Israel says and does in connection to China’s immediate neighborhood matters.
Another lesson for Israel is to avoid over-investing in the notion of a China thaw. Instead, Israel should pursue a multi-vector strategy that expands its presence across the Indo-Pacific while maintaining a pragmatic, carefully managed dialogue with Beijing.
Expanding ties with India, Japan, South Korea and key Southeast Asian countries offer multiple benefits. First, it diversifies Israel’s partnerships, reducing dependence on any single major power. Second, it enhances Israel’s leverage: Chinese analysts watch closely what Israel does in Asia, interpreting new alignments as signals of Israel’s strength. Third, it opens new channels for Israel to bring Indo-Pacific actors into Middle Eastern frameworks – whether through IMEC or through trilateral Track-II dialogues that span both regions.
IMEC is particularly important. By linking India, the Gulf, Israel and Europe, it establishes connectivity across regions where Israel sits at the geographic and technological center. For Israel, this corridor is not merely about trade. It is about positioning itself as a middle power capable of linking the Indo-Pacific to Europe via the Middle East. In doing so, Israel strengthens the Abraham Accords, bolsters its standing in the Indo-Pacific and demonstrates its strategic relevance to partners across continents.
How, then, should Israel proceed? Three priorities stand out.
First, maintain a nuanced approach to China. Avoid the temptation to cast Beijing solely as friend or foe. Instead, respond flexibly to shifts in Chinese rhetoric, pushing back when criticism touches on sensitive issues, but exploiting openings to press for moderation on Iran or the Palestinian issue.
Second, work through the Gulf. Israel’s leverage is magnified when coordinated with Gulf partners who hold significant economic weight in Beijing. This is true not only for issues like Iran but also for encouraging China to see the Abraham Accords as stabilizing.
Third, invest heavily in Indo-Pacific partnerships. Strategic dialogues with India, Japan, South Korea and key ASEAN members should be deepened across official and unofficial tracks. In parallel, Israel should aggressively promote IMEC, which reinforces the Abraham Accords and elevates Israel’s role from regional player to connective hub between the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
Indeed, the ripple effects of the Iran–Israel war are reshaping global perceptions of the Middle East. China, long eager to project influence, has discovered the limits of its reach. For Israel, this presents both challenges and opportunities. Beijing’s recalibration and occasional outreach should be welcomed but not overestimated. Already, shifts in Chinese rhetoric on arms transfers, Taiwan and CPEC reveal how fragile this “warming” may be.
Israel’s task is not to secure China’s favor but to leverage the fluidity of the moment. By carrying out strategic media campaigns, coordinating with Gulf partners, broadening its Indo-Pacific footprint and pressing forward with initiatives such as IMEC, Israel can turn a changing order into a strategic advantage.
The measure of success will not be Beijing’s goodwill but Israel’s ability to position itself as an indispensable middle power bridging regions and shaping outcomes in an increasingly interconnected world.
Tommy Steiner is the Policy Director of SIGNAL Group.
This article was originally published in JNS on August 27th, 2025. You can find that version here.
Cover photo: Shai Pal
