Where is China in the midst of the fast-paced movement of events in and around Syria?
The reshaping of the Syrian power landscape has contributed to the recent China rethink regarding its ambition to have a growing diplomatic role in the Middle East. Until four months ago, many in Beijing and across the Global South believed that Chinese influence in the Middle East was on an inevitable ascending trajectory since they facilitated the Iran-Saudi rapprochement in March 2023. Essentially, Assad’s downfall is another card lost from Beijing’s Middle East hand. Beijing bet on Iran against Israel at the outset of the war instigated by Hamas on Oct. 7 and joined by Hezbollah on Oct. 8. A series of Iranian strategic debacles vis-à-vis Israel — Iran’s drone and missile assaults on April 14 and October 1, and Israel’s retaliatory missile attack on Iran on October 26 that inflicted considerable damage on Iran’s air defenses and ballistic missile manufacturing — resulted in Beijing adjusting its Middle East approach.
The ‘high’ in Zhongnanhai from the accolades of the Iran-Saudi agreement, that included China’s Global Security Initiative – a coup for Beijing – led to the belief that China could play a significant role in mediating and guiding developments in the Middle East. That belief has come to an end, at least for the foreseeable future. Any doubt that Beijing lacks the regional understanding, influence, or leverage to take the diplomatic lead in the region where China’s establishment has long said that the U.S. is withdrawing, was sealed with the surprise and swift fall of Assad. Beijing is back to its pre-Iran-Saudi rapprochement view that it is not equipped to lead in this Middle East.
Where will Beijing go from here regarding its long-standing relations with Syria, where diplomatic ties were established in 1956?
Until Iran’s strategic losses to Israel, relations between China and Syria were on the upswing. In January 2022, Syria joined China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). In fact, as of today, all of the 22 Arab countries are partners of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Following the Iran-Saudi deal in March 2023, in May of that year the Arab League readmitted Syria to the fold which seemed to open the door for China and Syria to upgrade their relations just a few months later to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.’ Fourteen of the Arab states have a strategic or comprehensive strategic partnership with China.
While China had a small number of special forces in Syria since the early years of the Arab Spring to keep tabs on Chinese citizens there, by 2022, China had expanded its presence to include military advisors. They were reportedly in Syria to rebuild its military installations and to train their Syrian counterparts on a wide range of weapons purchased from China. There was also talk of cooperation over Syria’s ballistic missile program. Until two weeks ago, the combination of BRI cooperation and comprehensive strategic partnership meant that Sino-Syrian relations also included economic cooperation on infrastructure projects including electric power generation, gas, technology, and agriculture projects.
Recent developments put a definitive end to all that and Beijing has apparently returned to its default position in such situations – wait and see. It is watching to see how UAE and Saudi Arabia fare in cultivating relations with rebel groups. It is important to remember that China continues to have good relations with all Muslim countries in the region – including Qatar and Turkey – key players in the Syria episode of this ongoing Middle East drama. Regarding Israel, Beijing seems to be making modest moves to repair relations.
While China will continue to aspire and pursue an important economic, trade, and technological role in the Middle East, it has done a quick and drastic pull-back of its diplomatic role in the region.
Cover photo by Xinhua